Position of the Private Hospital in State Laws by Joachim, M. Ann
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 15 | Issue 2 Article 1
1-1-1940
Position of the Private Hospital in State Laws
M. Ann Joachim
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation




A Quarterly Law Review
VOL. XV JANUARY, 1940 NO. 2
THE POSITION OF THE PRIVATE HOSPITAL
IN STATE LAWS*
L EGAL questions concerning hospitals arise from the time
of their organization and continue through their entire
existence. We must realize that the Private Hospital is an in-
strument of democracy, which we need more today than ever
before.
What are we doing to retain and strengthen this institu-
tion? Hospitals must appreciate that it is necessary to be
vitally interested in legislative matters. Regulations regard-
ing almost every activity are being introduced, few of which
are advantageous. Directly and indirectly, hospitals are af-
fected by bills relating to hours of labor, wages, taxes, use of
drugs, medical procedure, rates, licenses, supervision, lia-
bility, and dozens of other problems, and what are we doing
to present our side of the proposals? What efforts are we
making to keep the hospital constantly before the public so
that they may become health-conscious and hospital-minded?
How can we expect their representatives, our legislators, to
understand our problems and to protect this needed demo-
* This article first appeared in HOSPITAL PROGRESS, the official journal
of the Catholic Hospital Association of the United States and Canada, (August,
1939, Vol. XX, No. 8). It is reprinted here with the permission of that journal,
because it is felt that its subject matter is of great interest to the lawyer, and its
publication is in keeping with the efforts of the newly created Bureau of Research
in Educational and Civil Church Law at the University of Notre Dame.
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cratic institution? Our future depends entirely on our edu-
cating the public concerning our functions, accomplishments,
and objectives.
Our discussion concerns private hospitals which are com-
monly incorporated under the laws of some state and are
either charitable non-profit or are organized for profit. The
title suggests that it be confined to legislation but for all
practical purposes the judicial decisions affect hospital opera-
tion just as much as does legislation. It is the courts who in-
terpret the laws.
CHARITABLE IN FORM OR IN FACT
One of our first encounters then is whether a hospital is
organized for profit or not, whether it may enjoy the privi-
leges on the one hand and be responsible for the duties on
the other, further how the courts have interpreted the con-
struction and the status of such an organization. There was
a time when a non-profit or charitable institution was ex-
empted from liability, but that is no longer the general rule.
It seems now to be the settled law in California I that the
charter of itself does not control the question whether the
corporation is organized for charitable purposes. The cor-
poration must not only call itself a charity, but it must so
conduct its business as to be in truth a philanthropic organi-
zation. This decision seems to be directed to the imposition
of liability on charitable hospitals. However, an earlier case 2
in the same state established the principle that if a corpora-
tion is essentially a charitable one, the mere fact that one of
its departments, the X-ray laboratory, earns a profit, does
not affect the general character of the institution, and fur-
ther, the department showing a profit is not to be considered
apart from the hospital itself in determining its status. Notice
the tendency to be less generous in fact and construction.
In the recent case of Silva v. Providence Hospital of Oak-
1 England v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan, 61 P(2) 48, Calif., 1936.
2 Ritchie v. Long Beach Community Hospital, 34 P(2) 771, Calif., 1934.
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land,' the Court held that not only the purpose of a corpora-
tion but its manner of operating determine its charitable
character. Evidence sustained the finding that the hospital
was operated for profit notwithstanding that the general
purposes might have been charitable. The hospital was held
liable for the negligence of its servants. In Oregon, the Court
held, in the case of Hamilton v. Cornwallis General Hospital,
that the failure of the defendant to make a profit did not
prove that it was a charitable corporation, and further "An
important feature of this case is the absence of any charitable
trust for the defendant to administer. There is no income
from a fund or funds created by 'contribution of benevolent
and charitably minded persons' to be used by the association
in relieving the distress of the needy. Even the trustees of the
association have a personal interest in the operation of the
institution." I The Courts are questioning more and more
the granting of immunity from liability for damages solely
on the basis of the form of incorporation. Proof that the or-
ganization is charitable in fact as well as in name is being
demanded. In Boetcher v. Budd in North Dakota,5 the de-
fendant was operating the hospital under a contract with an
association for three years, all profits to be retained by him.
The Court held that the facts did not substantiate the argu-
ment that the defendant was managing a charitable hospital
and was therefore liable for the negligence of the nurses. The
Evangelical Lutheran Hospital Association in Nebraska 1
was supported by subscriptions of stockholders and dividends
were declared on this stock. This is a clear case in which
the hospital was not organized as a charity. In the Arizona
case of Southern Methodist Hospital and Sanatorium in Tuc-
son v. Wilson,' which was appealed twice, the court definite-
ly stated that "the test is not whether the patients of the
3 87 P(2) 374, Cal. App. 1939.
4 146 Oregon 167; 30 P(2) 9.
5 61 N. D. 50; 237 N. W. 650.
o Malcolm v. Evangelical Lutheran Hospital Association, 107 Neb. 101; 185
N. IV. 330.
7 45 Ariz. 507; 46 P(2) 118.
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hospital pay more or less for their services, but whether those
charged with its operation were conducing it for their private
profit or advantage." New York concurs in saying that an
institution receiving pay patients does not change its status
as a charitable organization.8 A Missouri hospital was even
allowed to recover a judgment for services rendered a pa-
tient, holding that the trustees had the right to recover
money owing to the charitable trust.'
Lately, Courts have shown less generosity in granting hos-
pitals immunity from liability. Catherine Sheehan had been
a paying patient in the North Country Community Hospital,
a charitable corporation. She was being removed in its am-
bulance to her home. Negligence of the driver brought the
ambulance into collision with another vehicle and the plain-
tiff suffered injuries. On these facts there is squarely pre-
sented for the first time in the New York Court the question
whether a charitable institution, not itself in default in the
performance of any non-delegable duty, should be declared
exempt from liability to a beneficiary for personal harm
caused by the negligence of one acting as its mere servant
or employee. The Court held the defendant was not exempt
and submitted the question of negligence to the jury who
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.'0 There is ample
reason to believe that the future will bring more encroach-
ments on the rule of exemption and that other courts will be
influenced by this decision.
After it is determined whether the hospital is really char-
itable or not, the question of liability is still complicated.
Many questions arise which have not been foreseen by leg-
islators and it is then left to the courts. It is not surprising
then that there is a great diversity of opinion and ruling
among the various courts of last resort.
8 Collins v. New York P. G. Medical School and Hospital, 59 App. Div. 63;
69 N. Y. S. 106. See also McDonald v. Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432.
9 Barnes Hospital et al. v. Schultz, 90 S. W. (2) 164, Missouri.
10 273 N. Y. 163, 580; 7 N. E. (2), 28, 701; 248 App. Div. 632. Cf. Schloen-
dorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125; 105 N. W. 92.
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These decisions might be classed in three general groups
one which holds the hospital immune from all liability for
the injurious acts of its servants or employees; another which
holds the private charitable hospital just as liable as any
other individual or corporation; and a third, which avoids
the two extremes and in which most of the states concur, im-
poses liability or grants immunity under certain circum-
stances. The current against hospitals is gaining momentum
and the general opinion, that modern conditions do not justi-
fy that they receive special exemption, is increasing. In fact,
in this era, the whole social and political structure is under-
going a change. There can be no general rule for all cases.
One law always necessitates another so that legislation is so
voluminous and scattered that the actual or potential menace
of each cannot be estimated. Instead of investigating state
for state, let us look at the national picture from the various
cases which have been decided on important hospital ques-
tions.
LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO A PAYING PATIENT
It is well established in Utah that the hospital is liable
for negligence, of its nurses resulting in the death of a pay-
ing patient, notwithstanding that the hospital is organized
as a charity and gives charitable services. 1 The Supreme
Court of Utah has thus aligned itself with a growing minority
refusing to grant immunity to hospitals in these modern
times, saying that it is no longer necessary to protect such
institutions against individuals who are injured, just be-
cause they perform acts of charity. There was a time, they
agree, when such institutions were few and needed encour-
agement.1"
St. John's Hospital of Tulsa, Oklahoma, was sued by the
administrator of the estate of a deceased patient to recover
11 Art. 13, sec. 2 of the Constitution; see also William Budge Memorial Hos-
pital v. Maughan, 79 Utah 516; Getzhoffen v. Sisters of H. C. Hospital Associa-
tion, 32 Utah 46.
12 Sessions v. Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Association, 78 P(2) 645.
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damages for the alleged wrongful death of the delirious pa-
tient, who, while unguarded, jumped or fell from a hospital
window. The jury found that the hospital was negligent in
allowing the patient to remain unguarded and the court held
that a paying patient in a hospital conducted without stock
or profit, in which indigent patients are treated without cost,
and the fees exacted from patients who can pay are used in
promoting the work, may recover damages for injury caused
by the negligence of the attending nurse. Judgment was
$3,000 for loss of life and $500 for pain and suffering. 3
The Georgia decision that "although an institution which is chartered
as a hospital for the treatment of sick people is established primarily
as an eleemosynary or charitable institution, yet where in its operation,
it takes pay patients and charges them for it services, the institution is
liable to a patient who pays for the services rendered for injuries to the
patient while in the hospital, caused from the negligence of the institu-
tion, but the recovery would be restricted to the income derived from
the pay patients or from other non-charitable sources." 14
Georgia seems to concur with Utah and Oklahoma but on
careful study this decision will not have the same influence
because it is limited to paying patients and then only to the
extent of funds received from that or other sources not char-
itable. Services rendered to such patients usually exceed the
revenue derived so the chance of recovery is not very secure.
This case seems to fit between the Utah and Oklahoma de-
cisions and those which hold that even if charitable institu-
tions derive some profit from their services that does not
generally take it out of the class of charitable organizations.
Illinois has held that even "a person who pays an ade-
quate fee for services rendered by a purely charitable hos-
pital cannot maintain an action against the hospital for dam-
ages from injuries caused by the hospital's negligence." "s
13 Zeidler v. Sisters of the Sorrowful Mother, 82 P(2) 996, June 7, 1938.
14 Robertson v. Executive Committee of Baptist Convention, 190 S. E.
432 (Georgia).
15 Illinois Digest, 1938, Vol. 1, p. 529, citing Hogan v. Chicago Lying-In Hos-
pital & Dispensary, 335 II. 42, 166 N. E. 461, Affirming 247 A. 331.
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In Kentucky an action was brought by an administrator
of the estate of a pay patient who had fallen from a win-
dow in defendant's hospital shortly .after an operation. The
defendant pleaded that it -was-. a-haritable institution, and
the learned judge in his opinion said:
"An examination of authorities has convinced us that a purely charitable
institution such as defendant's hospital is described in the pleadings
to be, is not amenable to its patients, although paid ones, for any dam-
ages which they may have sustained growing out of the alleged neg-
ligence, although such negligence might consist in violation by the
hospital of some duty imposed either by an express or implied con-
tract." 16
A pay patient in an Indiana hospital suffered such a severe
burn because a nurse had placed a hot-water bottle on the
patient's foot that it ultimately resulted in the amputation
of the plaintiff's leg. Plaintiff was successful in the lower
court but this was reversed by the Supreme Court. The de-
fendant successfully alleged that it was a charitable organi-
zation, had no stock, paid no dividends, and made no profits.
The Court believed the rule that is sustained by the weight
of authority and the best reason to be, that a charitable in-
stitution or corporation is not liable to a beneficiary for an
injury caused by the negligence of its employees, and added
that this exemption does not extend to outsiders or third
persons.' 7
A similar case arose in New Mexico and the rule was not
altered just because the plaintiff was a pay patient.
"The rule is that those who furnish hospital accommodation and profit
thereby, but out of charity or in the course of the administration of a
charitable enterprise, are not liable for the mal-practice of the physicians
or the negligence of the attendants they employ, but are responsible only
for their own want of ordinary care in selecting them." 18
A pay patient in New Jersey fell and broke her left knee
cap while a nurse was attempting to remove her from a wheel
chair. The hospital gave evidence that the pay received was
10 Cook Adm. v. John N. Norton Memorial Infirmary, 180 Ky. 333.
17 Stine v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N. E. 537.
18 Price v. Deming Ladies Hospital Association, 276 Fed: 66S.
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disproportionate to the expense of caring for the patient
but the court was satisfied that the act under which the
hospital was organized was non-profit. It based its decision
oh the theory of public policy, but added:
"We are not required in this decision to go so far as to hold that a chari-
table corporation maintaining a hospital might not be liable to a patient,
if carelessness were shown in the selection of the agent responsible for
the injury, as that question is not raised in this case." 19
The fact that the defendant in a New York case accepted
pay for its services was held by the court not to amount to
a waiver of its right to claim an exemption from liability for
the negligence of its nurses.2 °
The majority view in charity hospital cases is that they
are not liable for the negligence of their employees even
when the party plaintiff is a pay patient, but the courts are
qualifying the three early theories of immunity. More are
now holding that the position of the pay patient is the same
whether in a charity hospital or in one conducted for profit
and that he should be entitled to the same remedies against
one as against the other. What merits particular attention
at the present time is the growing feeling that the individual
needs the protection of the law more than institutions.
LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OF SERVANTS
Probably the most discussed phase of hospital law is that
of liability for injuries to patients because of negligence of
servants and employees. When and to what extent is a char-
itable institution liable? The Supreme Court of Maine said
"No principle of law seems to be better established, both
upon reason and authority, than that which declares that a
purely charitable institution, supported by funds furnished
by private and public charity, cannot be made liable in dam-
19 D'Amato v. Orange Memorial Hospital, 101 N. J. L. 61, 127 Atl. 340.
20 Ward v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 23 Misc. Rep. 91, 50 N. Y. S. 466, reversing
39 App. Div. 624, 57 N. Y. S. 784.
THE PRIVATE HOSPITAL IN STATE LAWS
ages for the negligent acts of its servants."'. "A charitable
hospital is not liable for the torts or omission of its profes-
sional staff unless its has failed to exercise due care in selec-
ting the staff" is the Digest of a recent Illinois case,2" and
again, "Private charitable institutions, charitable organiza-
tion, as hospital, is not liable for action in tort for negligence
in its servants and employees." 23
The majority of States still hold that a private hospital
operated as a charity is not liable for negligence of em-
ployees where proper care was exercised in selecting them.24
Other courts held the hospital not liable unless it failed
to use due care in the selection or retention of the servants
who caused the injury. The burden of proof is on the plain-
tiff.25 Wisconsin gives as a reason that "the beneficiary of
a charity impliedly waives his right to sue in tort for the in-
juries negligently caused by the carefully selected agents of
his benefactor," 2" and further "such a hospital undertakes
not to heal or attempt to heal through the agency of others,
but merely to supply others who will heal or attempt to heal
on their own responsibility." 27 Virginia concurred in this,
saying that the only duty which a charitable hospital owes
to its patients is the exercise of due care in the selection and
retention of its servants. This court further explained the
competency of nurses in this regard.
21 Jensen v. Maine Eye and Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 AtI. 898. See
also Waldman v. Y. M. C. A. of Janesville, Wisconsin, 277 N. W. 632.
22 Olander v. Johnson, 258 A. 89, as quoted by Illinois Digest, 1938, Vol. 1,
p. 529.
23 Maretick v. South Chicago Community Hospital, 297 A. 488, 17 N. E. (2)
1012, quoted by Callaghan's Illinois Digest, 1939 Cumulative Supplement, p. 23.
24 . Stine v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 195 Ind. 350, 33 A. L. R. 1361. Roosen v.
Peter Bent Brigham Hosp., 235 Mass. 66, 15 A. L. R. 563. Taylor v. Flower
Deaconess Home, etc., 104 Ohio St. 61, 23 A. L. R. 900.
Barnes v. Providence Sanitarium, Texas, 229 S. W. 588. Williamson v. St. Paul's
Sanitarium, 164 S. W. 36. Moore v. Mississippi Baptist Hospital, 156 Miss. 676,
126 So. 465. Hendrickson v. Hodkin et al., 276 N. Y. 252.
25 Waddell v. Y. M. C. A., 15 N. E. (2) 140. (Ohio, 1938.) Hartley v. Bishop
Randall Hospital, 24 Wy. 408, 160 Pac. 385.
26 Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 170; 160 N. W. 173, 175. See also Silva v.
Providence Hospital of Oakland, 87 P(2) 374.
27 Morrison v. Henke, supra, 170
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
"It is not sufficient to say that a nurse is competent simply because she
is capable of discharging the manual duties incumbent upon her as a
nurse. It is a matter of common knowledge that the welfare of a patient
is as much the responsibility of the nurse as it is of the physician. If
she is lacking in educational preparation, if she is guilty of indiscretions
that impair her physical or mental status, if she is lacking in that moral
character which imbues the patient with confidence, then it cannot be
said that she is a competent person to be placed in charge of a help-
less patient." 28
The same principle of law was applied to all the so-called
"Hotwater bottle cases." No recovery was had unless the
plaintiff proved that the defendant did not exercise due care
in the selection and retenti6n of the employee in question.29
Recently more than ever before, it has been recommended
that a hospital seek protection by carrying liability insur-
ance. Often even when liability is established the hospital
can successfully claim exemption because of its charitable
character, but occasionally a hospital is assessed for large
damages. Does the fact that a hospital carries insurance af-
fect its standing in court? The courts have generally held
that the fact of insurance is immaterial; that it will not of
itself impose liability upon a charitable organization if no
liability exists under the laws of the State."°
The last few years have seen a remarkable increase in the
number of reported decisions not only in the United States
but also in Canada. The difficult problem concerning the lia-
bility of a hospital for the negligence of its trained nurses
was extensively discussed in the recent Canadian case of
Edward Fleming v. Sisters of St. Joseph of the Diocese of
28 Norfolk Protestant Hospital v. Plunkett, 162 Va. 151, (1938).
29 Wilson v. Southern Methodist Hospital and Sanitarium of Tucson, 46 P(2)
118, (1935). Bise v. Hospital, etc., 43 Pac. (2) 4, Washington, 1935. Boyd v. Baylor
University, 18 S. W (2) 700, Texas. Thibodoux v. Sisters of Charity, 38 La. App.
423, 123 So. 466.
30 Moore v. Miss. Baptist Hospital, 156 Miss. 676. See also West Suburban
Hospital v. Julia Peck, Circuit Court for Kane County, Illinois, No. 61380. Plain-
tiff sued to recover for services rendered, defendant filed counterclaim for injuries
sustatined because of unsafe lobby steps. Defendant contended her counterclaim
ought to succeed because of the fact the hospital was insured. Court held that
it made no difference on the question of liability.
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London, Ontario." The Supreme Court of Canada held the
defendant hospital liable for the negligence of one of its
nurses who had severely burned the plaintiff during a dia-
thermic treatment. The court held that the duty of the hos-
pital was not limited to supplying competent nurses; the
hospital having undertaken to provide certain treatment,
there was no reason to exonerate it for the negligent acts of
persons who were in its employ and subject to its control.
The Alabama court of last resort is severe in its opinion that: "there
exists no reason in law for the courts to create an exemption of a per-
son or association from liability for negligence of servants of such per-
son or association, merely because such servant is employed by such
master in the operation of an institution for purposes other than profit
or gain." 32
Then there is a Minnesota case in which the plaintiffs sued
for injuries -sustained when their infant child contracted tu-
berculosis while in the hospital. Evidence showed that the
nurse had a bad cough at the time she took care of the baby;
that everyone including the superintendent knew of the
cough; that the nurse was later found to be tubercular, and
the court held that the hospital was liable for communicating
infectious disease to a patient, saying:
"If, by the exercise of ordinary care, you can prevent this infection, then
you are bound to do so; and if you fail to use ordinary care to prevent
such fatalities, then you must answer in damages." 33
A verdict for $1,500 was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs.
The Minnesota case often quoted is the one where Law-
rence Grotte had been admitted to the defendant's hospital
as a pneumonia patient. He became delirious and during the
absence of attendants, jumped from the second story win-
dow of his room and was killed. It was shown that the at-
tendants knew of the patient's delirious state for some forty
31 2 D. L. R. 417; See discussion in Canadian Law Reports, Part III, 1938,
p. 172.
32 Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Association, 191 Ala. 572.
33 Taaje v. St. Olef's Hospital, 271 N. W. 109. See Stone v. Lutheran Deacon-
ess Home and Hospital, 280 N. W. 178, Minn., in which case the plaintiff failed
to prove negligence on the part of the defendant.
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hours before his death. The attending nurse left the window
slightly open and left the room for about five minutes. The
court held that the evidence of negligence was sufficient and
that liability should be imposed even though the defendant
was operating a charitable hospital:
"We do not believe that a policy or irresponsibility best subserves the
beneficient purposes for which the hospital is maintained. We do not
approve the public policy, which would require the widow and children
of deceased, rather than the corporation, to suffer the loss incurred
through the fault of the corporation's employees, or, in other words,
which would compel the persons damaged to contribute the amount
of their loss to the purposes of even the most worthy corporation. We
are of the opinion that public policy does not favor exemption from lia-
bility." 34,
Plaintiff recovered judgment in the sum of $6,500.
The plaintiff had paid for a special nurse in a Georgia
case; while in a delirious state and the nurse was off duty,
the plaintiff jumped out of a hospital window and the court
held the hospital liable for neglect of its duty to provide some
effective safeguard to protect the delirious patient.3 5
Not all cases involving injuries to delirious patients have
been decided the same way. The plaintiff's petition in an
Iowa case was dismissed as against the Sisters of Mercy
et al. Although the defendant was found to have failed in
providing proper window guards and failed to provide proper
attendants to the patient who was suffering from typhoid
fever, and while in the state of delirium had thrown himself
from the window in his room, was held exempt from liability.
The Iowa court was of the opinion that the defendant would
be liable only for failure to use due care in the selection of
its employees and that if it had exercised reasonable care
then it would not be liable for the negligent act of such em-
ployee. Since the plaintiff's petition failed to allege any facts
from which the court might infer that the defendant could
34 Mullin Adm. v. Evangeliches Diakoniessenverein, 144 Min. 372.
35 Ethel Shadburn v. Emory Univ., 47 Ga. App. 643, 1935.
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be proved guilty in that charge, the petition was dismissed
because of the defect.3 6
The South Dakota Supreme Court held that the hospital
was not required to take any precautions other than those
which would be taken by reasonable persons in the same
circumstances. In other words, the defendant was not re-
quired to anticipate that a delirious patient might succeed in
opening and jumping from a window. In this case delirium
followed six days after an appendix operation."'
Another "window" case resulted in favor of the hospital
in New York where a child fell out of a window during the
absence of the attendant. Defendant was a charitable in-
stitution and no lack of care in the selection or retention of
the attendant was shown by the plaintiff.3 8
This leads us to another question. Is the nurse an agent
and servant of the physician or of the hospital? Some duties
of a nurse are routine matters for the benefit of the hos-
pital, others are under the direct control of the physician.
Even in the operating room there may be acts over which
the hospital may have control. Under which category a
nurse's particular act will fall is a question of fact to be de-
termined in each individual case. Some courts hold that it is
the duty of the physician, in using the nurses furnished by
-the hospital, to see that every act necessary for the operation,
under his immediate supervision and control, is properly per-
formed. Under such circumstances the nurse is the- servant
of the operating surgeon." In a certain Missouri case, the
plaintiff, a pay patient, sued a charitable hospital to recover
damages for injuries "suffered by her as the result of negli-
gence on the part of one of the nurses in administering a
carbolic acid solution. The trial brought out the fact that
36 Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy et al., 183 Ia. 1378.
17 Fetzer v. Aberdeen Clinic et al., 48 S. D. 308.
88 Cunningham v. The Sheltering Aims, 135 App. Div. 178, 119 N. Y. S. 1033.
39 Emerson v. Chapman, 138 Oklahoma 270. It is a rule in Oklahoma that the
operating surgeon and not the hospital is responsible for the nurses. Hart v. Flower
Hospital,.62 P(2) 1248.
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the nurse was a private nurse, paid by the patient, and con-
sequently any negligence on her part could not be commuted
to the defendant.4" There are many other cases in which the
court decided that the nurse was a private duty nurse and in
the employ of plaintiff and hence defendant could not be
held.4
No successful defense has been presented by hospitals in
defending a suit to recover damages for the unlawful de-
tention of a body. In the Ohio case of Howard v. Children's
Hospital of the Protestant Episcopal Church, the defendant
was charged with violating a statute permitting recovery of
not less than $500 or more than $5,000 against persons guilty
of unlawfully possessing a corpse. The defense that it was a
charitable institution was of no avail to the hospital. The
Court said:
"It can hardly be imagined that the legislature did not have in mind
hospitals supported by benevolence and administering charity when en-
acting the statute quoted. It must have been foreseen that such organi-
zations would come within the operation of the statute which creates
a liability upon any person, association or company having unlawful
possession of a deceased person." 42
And in Oklahoma, the court said: "The wrongful dissection
of a dead body is regarded as a wilful and intentional wrong
against the person entitled to the possession and control of
the body for burial, and a recovery may be had for the
mental anguish resulting from such a mutilation."43
LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO THIRD PERSON
Does the same reasoning of liability and immunity apply
when the injured is a servant, an employee, a visitor or a
stranger? Most courts have held the hospital liable if the
40 Nicholas v. Evangelical Deaconess Home and Hospital, 281 Mo. 182.
41 Kamps v. Crown Heights Hospital, Inc., 277 N. Y. 602. (1938). Ware v.
Culp, California, 74 P(2) 283. Hoke v. Glann, 167 N. C. 594. Silva v. Providence
Hospital of Oakland, Calif., 87 P(2) 374. See splendid article on "Hospital Respon-
sibility for Professional Service of the Private-Duty Nurse," by Sister M. Livinia,
R.N., B.S., HosPrAL PROoGrSS, May, 1932, Vol. 13, p. 208.
42 37 Ohio App. 144.
43 McPosey v. Sisters of the Sorrowful Mother, 57 P(2) 617.
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victim was not a beneficiary and not a patient and the de-
fendant was guilty of negligence.44 In Missouri, however, a
plaintiff employee was injured as the result of her hand be-
ing caught in a defective ironing machine because a guard
was out of place. The court decided in favor of the defendant
because it was a charitable hospital.45 Contradicting decision
is to be found in New Hampshire where the plaintiff was a
student nurse and was assigned to a contagious case but was
not so informed. The patient developed diphtheria and the
plaintiff contracted it also. The court held that the defendant
was negligent and that it was an adopted rule in that state
that charitable hospitals were not to be held exempt from
the consequences of their negligent acts. They are to be
treated as all other individuals and corporations.46
As to visitors, the Ohio Court held as a matter of law that
there could be no recovery by a visitor unless there was
sufficient proof that the hospital failed to exercise ordinary
care.4 In another case, the plaintiff was bringing some in-
jured men into the hospital when he fell over a wire. It was
an unfortunate accident but there was no negligence shown.48
As in other cases, contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff prevents recovery. A nurse employed by a patient,
slipped on the floor of the room in which the patient was
confined. The floor was covered with standard linoleum
which had been cleaned and waxed in the ordinary manner.
The nurse could have seen and did see the condition it was
in and had previously complained about it but continued to
44 Cowans v. North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Inc., 197 N. C. 41. In Kolb
v. Monmouth Memorial Hospital, 116 N. J. L. 118. Plaintiff recovered $9,750 for
injuries sustained. Duvelius v. Sisters of Charity, 123 Ohio S. 52.
45 Whittaker v. St. Luke Hospital, 137 Mo. App. 116. See also Amery v.
Jewish Hospital Association, 193 Ky. 400.
46 Hewitt v. Woman's Hospital Aid Ass'n, 73 N. H. 556. See also Martha
v. Flower Hospital et al., 228 N. Y. 183.
Note: An interne is an employee of the Hospital within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hospital et al., 236 N. Y.
269.
47 Bonawitt v. Sisters of Charity, 43 Ohio App. 347, 183 N. E. 661. See also
Daniel v. Jackson Infirmiry, 173 Miss. 832, (1935).
48 Ammons v. St. Peter's Hospital, Inc., 195 N. C. 548, 142 S. E. 765.
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discharge her duties. The hospital was compelled to exercise
reasonable care, and the nurse failed to prove that it had
not, and further the condition of the floor was as well known
to the nurse as it was to the defendant, and she could not re-
cover.49 Is a third person who enters the hospital as a visitor
considered a beneficiary and therefore prevented from re-
covering for injuries sustained? The New Jersey Law says
that she is. The plaintiff came to visit her daughter; she
came voluntarily and for her own purposes. She fell and was
injured. She tried to show that the defendant was negligent
in not removing the wet spot on the stairs which was the
cause of her fall. The court held that she was a recipient of
the same benevolence as was the patient and applied the
theory that public policy denies recovery.5"
Louisiana had made an inroad on the doctrine of exemp-
tion from liability for negligence on the part of charitable
organizations. The plaintiff was injured by a truck owned by
the defendant. The court held that he was not a beneficiary
and that he could recover because all persons and corpora-
tions must answer for the consequences of their negligent
acts.51 In the New Jersey automobile accident case the judge
agreed with the soundness of the trust fund, public policy
and implied waiver theories, but held that the plaintiffs were
absolute strangers to the defendant and had obtained no
benefits from them, further that to uphold the defendant
in its selection of servants and in the carelessness of those
selected would be "repugnant to one's sense of justice." 52
Again, the Minnesota court stressed this point, saying
"Where innocent persons suffer through their fault, they
should not be exempted. . . .It is almost contrary to hold
that an institution organized to dispense charity shall be
49 Mautino v. Sutter Hospital Assn., 211 Calif. 556; 206 P. 76.
50 Boeckel v. Orange Memorial Hospital, 108 N. J. L. 453, 158 At. 832. See
also Foley v. Wesson Memorial Hospital, 246 Mass. 363, 141 N. E. 113.
51 Bougon v. Volunteers of America et al., 151 So. 797.
52 Simmons et al. v. Wiley Methodist Episcopal Church et al., 112 N. J. L.
129, 170 Atl. 237.
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charitable and extend aid to others, but shall not compensate
or aid those injured by it in carrying on its activities." 53
Loss OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
Other problems have arisen for the private hospital to
solve. To what extent is it responsible for the loss of personal
property? New York holds the private hospital liable. In the
instant case the plaintiff recovered for the loss of bridgework
which was given to one of defendant's nurses. The court held
that persons or corporations conducting private hospitals
for profit have no exemption for the negligent acts of their
servants. 4 Concerning the liability of a charitable hospital
for the loss of jewelry, Ohio held that it was "unable to make
any distinction between cases involving damages to the per-
son of a patient and damages to his property, where such are
caused by the wrongful act of an employee" " and that
there being no proof that defendant was negligent in select-
ing or retaining the servant in question, the plaintiff failed
to recover. The plaintiff had entered the hospital uncon-
scious and later found her jewelry miss'ng and the defendant
claimed to have delivered the valuables to a person believed
to have been the plaintiff's son-in-law but was an imposter.
LIABILITY OF THE PRIVATE PROFIT HOSPITAL
The laws of the various states agree that private hospitals
organized for profit have approximately the same respon-
sibility as other corporations or individuals. Private institu-
tions are obliged, by express or implied contract, to render
reasonable care and attention to their patients for their safe-
ty, as their mental and physical condition, if known, may re-
quire.
Such private hospitals, conducted for .gain, have been held
liable for the negligent and careless acts of nurses and other
53 Geiger v. Simpson M. E. Church, et al. 174 Minn. 389. See also Murtha v.
N. Y. Homeopathic Medical College et al., 228 N. Y. 183.
54 Yohalem v. Yasuma, 300 N. Y. 929.
55 Rudy vs. Lakewise Hospital, 115 Ohio S. 539.
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employees. The master is responsible for the acts of his
servants if they are within the scope of his employment."e
In the instant Indiana case, one Baker brought a suit
against Iterman and the New Castle Clinic. The Clinic urged
as a defense that since a corporation cannot practice medi-
cine, and the suit was for malpractice, that it should be re-
lieved from liability. The court held that defendant Iterman
was an agent and employee of the Clinic, and since the Clinic
was a corporation organized for gain, that it was responsible
for the acts of its agents and employees, and the plaintiff
recovered.57
Let us review a few of the more interesting decisions under
this classification. In this Georgia case, the plaintiff's suit
was dismissed by the trial court but this order was reversed
by the Supreme Court. It seems as if a certain electric fan
was placed in the plaintiff's room three days after an opera-
tion; that after it had been running for an hour and a half
it flew to pieces and exploded. All this noise and confusion
shocked and frightened the plaintiff and she jumped up, her
stitches were pulled out, and an infection set in causing
much pain and discomfort. The court said among other
things, "we do not understand that it is the law of Georgia
that there can be no recovery of damages for fright result-
ing from ordinary negligence, where such fright directly and
immediately causes physical injury." "
Mrs. Stevenson won an affirmation of a $5,000 judgment
in California against a hospital and a nurse. The patient was
admitted to the hospital and treated for paralysis following
a stroke. While learning to walk with the help of two nurses,
56 Meridian Sanatorium v. Scruggs, 83 So. 532, Miss. Fawcett v. Ryder, 135
N. W. 800, N. D. Duke Sanatarium v. Hearn, 159 Okla. 1, 13 P. (2) 183. Derrick v.
Portland Eye, Ear, Nose and Throat Hospital, 105 Ore. 90, 209 P. 344. Tate v.
McCall Hospital, 196 S. E. 906, Ga. Green v. Biggs, 167 N. C. 417, 83 S. E. 553.
Flower Hospital v. Hart, 62 P. (2) 1248, Oklahoma. Parrish v. Clark et ux, 145 So.
848, Florida.
57 Baker v. Iterman, 11 N. E. 2, 64, Indiana.
58 R. M. Garner v. Neuman Hospital, 198 S. E. 122, Georgia.
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one left her side to prepare a chair for the patient, the sec-
ond nurse was unable to support her and she fell, painfully
injuring herself.59
In Idaho, if the plaintiff could prove that the nurses were
in the employ of the hospital at the time of the operation,
recovery could be had as against the hospital, because private
hospitals are liable for the negligence of their employees,
but if the defendant proved that they were in the employ
of the operating surgeon it would be relieved from liability.60
Mabel W. Lofgren operating a private hospital was sued
by the patient, Rose Goldfoot, for injuries sustained because
of negligence. Plaintiff had her tonsils removed and shortly
thereafter abcesses formed in the lungs, which were alleged
to have been caused by aspiration of infected blood during
the post-operative period. Expert witnesses agreed that the
patient should have been kept on her side so that the blood
could flow from her mouth. The patient's husband testified
that the nurse made no effort in this regard and the jury
found the defendant negligent and the plaintiff recovered.6 1
In Maine, a patient had recovered $2,000 damages and
her husband the sum of $500 at the first trial and now it
was reduced to $500 and $200 respectively, because there
was conflict in the evidence as to contributory causes which
brought about the injuries complained of. The question of
liability, however, was not raised but just the extent of
damages.62
The much-appealed and much-discussed case of Hendrick-
son v. Hodkin merits our attention. It was first tried with
the question of liability for negligence of the physician of im-
portance. All three defendants were held responsible but only
the hospital appealed and on this appeal the complaint was
dismissed because, as the court held, "The rule is now well
59 Stevenson v. Alte Bates Inc., 66 P. (2) 1265, California.
60 Corey v. Beck et aL, 72 P. (2) 856, Idaho.
61 135 Or. 533, 296 P. 843.
62 Mills v. Richardson, 125 Me. 12, retried in 126 Me. 244.
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settled that a hospital, whether charitable or private, is im-
mune from liability to patients by reason of the negligence
of its doctors with respect to any matter relating to the pa-
tient's medical care and attention." "' At the second trial
the question was on the liability of a private institution for
permitting treatment by a non-medical practitioner, and the
court held "Private non-charitable hospital corporations op-
erated for profit ar liable for the torts of their executive
officers committed within the general scope of their author-
ity." Further that:
"In the case at bar the basis of liability is not the negligence of the
doctor or nurse in charge, but the wrongful conduct of the executive
manager and superintendent acting within the scope of his authority
in offering for pay the use of the hospital and its facilities for the pur-
pose of the commission of acts which constitute a tort, and a crime in
violation of a duty owed a patient." 64
Noting a few of the facts we find that the defendant corpo-
ration permitted a non-medical practitioner the use of hos-
pital facilities to carry on his treatment for the care of can-
cer for several weeks. This "cure" injured the plaintiff to
such an extent that after a few weeks there was no lip or
chin left and the patient's teeth fell out. The manager and
superintendent had the right and even the obligation to re-
fuse facilities to one not authorized to practice medicine un-
der the state laws, and since they did not exercise reasonable
care for the safety of this patient, they were held responsible.
Take heed and do not permit one with doubtful qualifications
to practice medicine in your institution. Ascertain from the
local medical society or from the state license commission
whether such an applicant is in good standing.
Not all cases which have reached the highest court of any
of the states have been successful for the plaintiff against
private hospitals. They are scarce but in the much quoted
63 250 App. Div. 619, 294 N. Y. S. 982. Discussed in MINNESOTA LAW RF-
vIEW, Vol. 22, 1937-1938, pp. 283-4.
64 HendricksQn v. Hodkin, et al., 276 N. Y. 252, reversing 250 App. Div. 619,
294 N. Y. S. 982.
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case of Schloendorff v. The Society of the New York Hos-
pital, 5 the plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for an
operation which had been performed without her consent.
She was a pay patient and claimed that she had notified
the doctors and the nurses that she would undergo an exam-
ination but that she would not permit them to operate. No
proof was shown that the administrative department of the
hospital had heard of the patient's instructions to the nurses
or the doctors and did not interfere with their work. The
court agreed that the physicians and the nurses were inde-
pendent of the hospital and if they violated their patient's
demands it was not commutable to the hospital. It was in
this case also, that the rule was laid down that the nurse
was the agent of the operating surgeon and not of the hos-
pital.
To what extent is the hospital responsible for injuries re-
sulting from the premature discharge of a patient? We know
that it is very difficult to get out of a hospital, and cases simi-
lar to this one in North Carolina must have been the cause.
Plaintiff Bowdick had a leg injury and was being treated
at defendant hospital when he decided that he would like
to go home. He told a student nurse his desire and she prom-
ised to see his physician and would send up the bill if it was
all right. Later, a clerk brought the plaintiff his bill and he
returned to his home although he was suffering from a frac-
tured leg. The court said:
"In the case at bar the plaintiff selected his own physician. Therefore
the hospital assumed no liability and was charged with no responsibility
for the medical treatment of plaintiff or the time when the relationship
of patient and physician should be terminated by discharge of the
patient. Nor was the hospital, under the circumstances, charged with
any duty in procuring termination of the relationship of patient and
physician. Hence, if no such duty was imposed upon the defendant, and
if it did not assume the performance of such duty, then there is no
negligence upon its part, and consequently no liability." 6G
65 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92, affirming the judgment of 149 App. Div. 915,
133 N. Y. S. 1143.
66 Bowdick v. French Broad Hospital, 201 N. C. 168.
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The nurse was not considered an agent of the hospital and
hence the hospital could not be charged with negligence or
lack of reasonable care on behalf of the patient.
We can note another case, in which the patient was treated
for temporary insanity. His father requested less service af-
ter signs of improvement. Later, when the attendant left the
patient for a few moments the patient walked up several
steps and then fell from a landing over the banisters. Plain-
tiff claimed that the defendant was negligent in permitting
him to be unattended. The evidence was conflicting, the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the defendant which the su-
preme court affirmed.67
LIABILITY ON CONTRACTS
Charitable Hospitals have been granted certain exemp-
tions in order to foster and encourage the development of
such institutions, but when a hospital, no matter what the
legal status, enters into a legal contract to perform certain
acts such an agreement will be enforced. Their liability for
breach of contract is the same as that of any other person
or private corporation.6" It is of no consequence whether
the contract is made with a patient, employee, physician or
business organization. Whether a contract exists or not, and
whether it was properly fulfilled is generally a question for
the jury to decide.69
An interesting legal problem arose in an Illinois court in
1936 where a mother and her new born son remained in the
hospital for about ten days and upon their removal to their
home the child developed erysipelas from which it died. The
Illinois courts hold, as all others, that the hospital, even
though it be charitable, is liable for the negligent acts of
agent or employee in violating a valid contract. In this case
67 Stansfield v. Gardner, 193 S. E. 375, Georgia.
68 Loewinthen v. Beth David Hospital, et al., 9 N. Y. S. 2 367. See also the
famous case of Roche v. St. John's Riverside Hospital, 161 N. Y. S. 1143.
69 Coffey v. Northwestern Hospital Ass'n, 183 P. 762.
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there had been an agreement for the care of child and mother
for a stipulated price, and had the plaintiff been able to prove
that the child contracted erysipelas while in the hospital,
because of the defendant's negligence in caring for the child,
i. e., in carrying out the terms of the contract, she might
have recovered damages from the hospital. "'
HOSPITAL LIEN LAWS "'
These laws are passed to protect hospitals, physicians or
nurses and in some jurisdictions all three.72 They usually give
an institution or person the right to interpose a claim for the
services rendered to an injured person. These laws differ in
some detail in the various states but they all describe the
individual or institution who shall be entitled to such pro-
tection, whether it is the nurse or physician or the hospital
and What kind of hospital, public or private, profit or non-
profit. Another provision sets forth the manner of lien,
whether it shall be effective against real and personal proper-
ty, all rights of action, suits, claims, counterclaims or de-
mands of any patient receiving treatment, care and main-
tenance on account of personal injuries received in any ac-
cident, or whether it is more restricted; whether the acci-
dent must have resulted from negligence of any other per-
son or corporation or whether the lien can attach even if the
patient was guilty of negligence if covered by insurance. The
extent to which the lien should apply varies also because the
states have different forms of government and means of
carrying out their laws. In some states insurance companies
and lawyers oppose such a law, and if passed by the legis-
lature they do what they can to make it ineffective in prac-
tice.
70 Mater v. Silver Cross Hospital, 2 N. E. (2) 138.
71 Compiled from State Digests, Copies of Bills received from the various
State Legislatives, Legislative Bulletins of the American Hospittal Ass'n, and




At least seventeen states have enacted lien laws. 3 The
variations in the present laws of these states make an inter-
esting study. Some lien laws cover only charitable institu-
tions, others those supported in whole or in part by public
funds, but rarely is the small doctor-owned or private hos-
pital given this protection.
Montana, New York and Virginia place the lien of the
attorney first and then of the hospital. Others make no spe-
cial mention and presume that the order in which they are
filed will govern. North Carolina's law states that the lien
shall not exceed 50% of recovery excluding attorney fees. 4
New Jersey permits recovery only for ward rates. Virginia
limits the amount of the hospital lien to $200, 71 and by Chap.
374 of the 1938 Acts of the Assembly, it limited the amount
from physicians to $50 and $50 for all nurses. Most of the
states provide full remuneration for reasonable services and
accommodations. The laws differ in various other details,
liens must be filed within five days after the injury in some
states, in others within ten days; and in still others within
twenty days. Some states require suit for the enforcement
of lien to be started within one year, others, within two years.
In some the usual statute of limitations for all claims hold.
Filing fees range all the way from 12 cents to $1, some charge
an additional fee per folio for entry. Most of the states re-
quire 25 cents to file and 25 cents to discharge the lien.
California has no lien law, but since 1929 the owner of
the motor vehicle is responsible for all accidents, that is, if
the driver thereof had permission for the use of the car from
the owner at the time of the accident. This, at least, helps a
73 Arkansas, Connecticut, perhaps the first to enact Hospital lien law in 1926,
Sec. 189. Delaware, Chap. 179, 1931. See Revised Code, Sec. 3360, 1935. Indiana,
Iowa, Maryland, Chap. 491, 1937. Minnesota, Montana, Chap. 57, 1931. Nebraska,
New Jersey, Chap. 231, 1931; New York, Chap. 534, 1936, North Carolina, Chap.
121-122, 1935; North Dakota, Chap. 163, 1935; Oregon, Chap. 400, 1931; Texas,
Virginia, Chap. 287, 1932. Acts of the Assembly, p. 517, Chap. 374, 1938 Acts;
Washington, Chap. 69, 1937.
74 Chap. 121, Laws of 1935.
75 Chap. 287, 1932.
THE PRIVATE HOSPITAL IN STATE LAWS
little in making collections. Massachusetts and Wisconsin
have no lien laws. Insurance companies and the hospitals
have a friendly agreement in which the insurance company
withholds the amount of the hospital bill from any settle-
ment. Minnesota has a lien law which has worked satisfacto-
rily since 1933, it also has a compulsory insurance law re-
quiring motorists to carry accident insurance. Massachuetts
has only the compulsory insurance. Most of the lien laws do
not extend to cases coming under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act or Public Liability. New York adds that the laws
do not apply where the recovery by the patient is under
$300.' Washington's Physician and Hospital liens are for
the value of the services, plus costs and such reasonable at-
torneys' fees as the court may allow, incurred in enforcing
the lien, but it cannot exceed 25% of the award.77 Montana
adds that no lien shall exceed the provisions of the schedule
of fees, as adopted by the Montana State Medical Associa-
tion.7
Louisiana has a law " whereby a hospital could be sub-
rogated to the rights of a patient. It could recover for serv-
ices rendered from the party causing injury to the patient
and thus secure its bill for hospitalization. These are the
facts. Mrs. Effie Jones brought suit against the driver of an
automobile who caused the death of her son. She included
in the suit the American Mutual Liability Insurance Com-
pany who carried the insurance. Charity Hospital of the
State of Louisiana intervened in this suit in order to re-
cover $353 for services rendered the deceased. The trial
court dismissed the petition of the hospital but the Court
of Appeals reversed that order and entered judgment in favor
of the plaintiff and the hospital, stating that under the law
76 Chap. 534 of the Laws of 1936; Sec. 189 of the N. Y. Lien Law.
7T Chap. 69, Laws of 1937.
78 Chap. 57, Laws of Montana, 1931; Sec. 8993, Revised Code of Montana
of 1921.
79 Act No. 320 of 1932.
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the hospital had the right to recover if the plaintiff did.8"
The hospital in this case was protected, but what of the
thousand like cases which are settled out of court with in-
surance companies to which this law of subrogation and in-
tervention could not apply. What percentage of accounts for
services rendered the injured in automobile cases are lost
to the hospital? The legislatures of the various states are be-
ginning to realize the losses such institutions sustain each
year and efforts have been repeatedly made for their pro-
tection.
Most of the thirty-one states which have as yet no hospital
lien law have made an effort in the last few years to seek that
protection. One must realize that in 1937 there were 6,128
hospitals registered by the American Medical Association in
the United States, 617 were refused registration, 100 whose
registration was pending, 70 more hospitals which were un-
der construction and 179 were planning construction, or a
grand total of 7,094 hospitals. Of the registered hospitals
2,693 were non-profit organizations, 1,713 were proprietary
profit organizations, a total of 4,406 non-governmental, as
compared to 1,722 governmental. Let us just get a glimpse
of the efforts made in some of these states:
Colorado: In 1935 and in 1937 (S. 276 and S. 633) had bills intro-
duced relating to liens of hospitals for the care and treatment of in-
jured persons.
Delaware: Has a lien law since 1931 and in 1939 had a bill introduced
(S. 253) providing for a Uniform State Act concerning Liens for
money due physicians, dentists, nurses, hospitals, etc.
Florida: In 1937 two bills were introduced (S. 485 same as H. 899)
which provided that a lien for any medical nursing or hospital service
shall not exceed maximum fees prescribed by the Florida Industrial
Commission if such fees have been fixed.
Georgia: Lien bills for physicians and hospitals were presented and
killed in the Senate (S. 37, 1937). Early in 1935 a bill (H. 331)
was introduced "for the creating in favor of hospitals and sanitariums
a lien on the claim or action for damages on the part of any per-
son receiving hospital and medical care by reason of personal in-
80 185 So.*50 9.
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juries based on the negligent act of another; to provide how said lien
shall be claimed and perfected; and for other purposes." In 1939
H. 526 was introduced amending Title 52, Code of 1933, relating to
liens in favor of Taverns, etc., so as to extend the provision of said
title to hospitals.
Illinois: H. 236 was introduced in 1935 "Concerning liens of physi-
cians, surgeons, dentists, drugless practitioners, nurses and hospitals,
for services rendered for the relief and cure of persons injured through
neglect of others, on claims, judgments and rights of action accruing
to such injured person by reason of such injuries." In 1937, S. 8 was
introduced which would limit lien for both physician and hospital to
one third of sum paid to the insured.
On Jan. 24, 1939, S.B. 52 providing for liens for dental, medical
and surgical treatment of injured persons was referred to the Public
Welfare Committee.
Indiana: This State has a lien law but H. 224 was introduced per-
mitting hospitals to file liens on damages which patients collect. It
was referred to the judiciary Committee on Jan. 24, 1939, and died
in the House.
Kansas: H. 509 was introduced early in March, 1939. It provided
that "hospitals caring for injured persons shall have a lien upon
damages recovered by such injured persons." Did not apply to
workmen's compensation cases, and is junior to attorneys' liens, pro-
vided for filing a notice also. This was approved by the House on
March 30, 1939.
Maine: In 1937, S. 282 was introduced, stating that hospital liens
become void unless itemized statement is filed within 60 days after
termination of 'care and unless suit is begun to reduce such claim to
judgment within one year after termination of treatment.
On Feb. 15, 1939, H. 1416 which authorizes liens on insurance pro-
ceeds in favor of hospitals was referred to the Committee on Judiciary
and later died in the House.
Massachusetts: In this State there is compulsory insurance but no lien
law. In 1935 "H. 1109 was introduced for liens of physicians, nurses
and hospitals, it provided for the reasonable value of services neces-
sarily performed; was not to apply to those eligible under the work-
men's compensation act, giving rules for filing but stating that if an
action is pending for the recovery of such damages that it would be
sufficient to file the notice of such lien in the pending action.
In 1936 Bill No. H. 1045 for physician's liens was introduced but was
killed.
Finally in 1938 S. 166 for nurse's liens was introduced which provided
for the securing of liens by nurses to cover charges for services ren-
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dered to personal injury cases. The Board of Registration of nurses
was to establish a schedule of rates for each county which were to be
used for charges covered by the lien.
Michigan: S. 60, 1937 liens for hospitals only was rejected.
Missouri: Liens in favor of public and charity supported hospitals,
clinics, etc. with hospital charges limited to reward rates was ex-
pressed in S. 76 introduced in 1937.
In 1939 S. 22 was introduced providing that public or private clinics
and hospitals, supported in whole or part by charity or the state,
shall have a lien upon the claims, suits, rights of action, etc., of any-
one admitted to the hospital.
New Hampshire: H. 153 -was introduced in 1935 to provide for liens
in favor of hospitals furnishing care, treatment and maintenance of
persons injured in accidents upon the rights of action.
New Jersey: The State has had a lien law since 1931, Chap. 231.
Many other states have modeled their law after New Jersey's.
In 1937, by A. 499, an effort was made to repeal the lien law in or-
der to correct an evil condition which has developed under the law
as it is at present and that the passage of the act would not in any
way affect the liens of hospitals in accident cases.
In 1938 a bill was introduced, A. 233, by which hospitals were to be.
given preference in claims against decedents' estates. Judgments en-
tered against the decedent in his lifetime, funeral expenses, hospital
bills, whether of a public or private hospital, physicians' and nurses'
bills during the last sickness should have preference, and be first paid
out of the personal and real estate of the decedent.
S. 321 was also introduced and approved.in 1938. It created a lien-
in favor of State and County institutions upon the real and personal
property of persons receiving care and treatment therein, and sup-
plementing Title 30 of the Revised Statutes, shall have a lien against
the property of persons confined therein and receiving care and treat-
ment. Such lien when properly filed as set forth herein shall have
priority over all unrecorded encumbrances and shall be in an amount
to be determined as provided in Title 30 aforesaid. Enacted 1938.
Chap. 239.
Details as to name and method of recording were submitted in S. 174
and S. 175, 1939.
S. 209 would make it unnecessary for the physician to file a state-
ment of the injuries sustained by an injured person in establishing
a lien but S. 210 "Providing that where an injured person is treated
in a public institution that the staff physician or his assistant who
has charge of the case shall be retained by the person accused of the
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negligence or his insurance carrier or if such physician transmits in-
formation or advice to a person accused of causing the accident or
his insurance carrier." Public Health Committee reported favorably
March 9, 1939.
New York: Chap. 534 of 1936 gave New York its lien law. Numerous
efforts have been made to amend this Act and even to repeal it. We
will glance at just a few. S. 915 was introduced in 1937 in order to
amend. S. 2091, same as A. 2526 limits liens to fees charged, the rates
not to exceed cost rates in hospitals. Provision is made whereby after
filing of lien the injured person, his legal representative or the hos-
pital, may' serve a notice of motion whereby the court will determine
the amount to which the hospital is entitled for treatment of patients
which shall determine the amount of the lien.
In 1938, S. 869 gives physicians a lien; S. 876 gives registered nurses
lien on rights of action, suits, etc., and A. 858 physicians lien except
where settlement or verdict is less than $300.00.
In 1939, A. 340 same as S. 323 filing fees, etc.; A. 413, similar to
A. 858 of 1938; A. 2028 repeals portions. S. 1349 same as A. 1400
provides that person or corporation making payment to person for
injuries sustained shall remain liable to hospital having lien, etc., for
period of one year from date upon 'which a written notice of pay-
ment shall have been mailed, registered mail, to the hospital, instead
of one year from date of payment. S. 1800 fixes county clerk's fees
for hospital liens at 25c instead of 12c for filing claims and 25c for
every search, 50c for discharging.
North Carolina: This State has a lien law since 1935, Chap. 121, 122,
not to exceed 50% of recovery excluding attorney's fees. S. 96, 1937,
provides for liability insurance for each owner of an automobile and
truck, further it specifies that all services for first aid, medical and
hospital care, funeral expenses and repairs of automobiles shall be a
first lien upon the amount awarded a claimant.
H. 63 was introduced, 1939, to amend section 3 of Chapter 122, P. L.
1935 in favor of sums due for medical attention and hospitalization
but this died in the House.
Ohio: Medical Lien Bill H. 454 was introduced in Ohio in 1937 which
allows physicians, hospitals, dentists, nurses to file lien for services to
persons injured against settlement made to injured party, but ex-
cepts workmen's compensation.
Oklahoma: In 1935 S. 62 was introduced to create liens to assure
doctors and hospitals their payment. H. 90 was also introduced the
same year, providing a lien for doctors, nurses and hospitals from
awards and judgments to injured persons.
Oregon: A lien law has been in force since 1931, Chap. 400. Section
4 states "no rights or claims for lien under this act shall be allowed
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for hospitalization rendered an injured person after a settlement has
been effected by or on behalf of the party causing the injury."
S. 353, 1939 was submitted but withdrawn in the Senate.
Pennsylvania: An effort was made by H. 2109 in 1937 to amend Act
of April 26, 1855, P. L. 309, to make an amount recovered liable
for the payment of expenses of last illness and funeral expenses.
Rhode Island: In 1936, S. 27 was introduced providing a lien for the
value of services rendered by any physician, nurse, dentist, or hos-
pital in the treatment or care of any person injured through the fault
or neglect of another; defining the manner of perfecting such lien
and providing to what it shall attach and the liability thereon. This
bill died in the Senate.
In 1939, H. 782 providing a lien in favor of hospitals for services
rendered to persons injured as result of accident providing liens on
insurance in accident cases, was introduced and referred to Judiciary
Committee.
South Dakota: In 1939, S. 25 was introduced and referred to the
Committee on Judiciary. This provided that any person rendering
personal service shall have a lien upon property, real or personal.
Tennessee: H. 1111 was introduced in 1937, and H. 758 this session
(1939) providing for hospital lien, both died in the House.
Utah: This State made an effort in 1935 for a hospital lien law in
the introduction of S. 170 but failed.
Virginia: A hospital lien law was operated since 1932, Chap. 287, but
it was amended, Chap. 374, 1938, as to provide that where personal
injury results in death the lien of a physician, hospital or nurse caring
for the decedent can be asserted against either a judgment or com-
promise because of the injuries and death or the general estate of
the decedent, but not against both.
As has been noted, lien laws have been adopted by at least
seventeen states. They are not all entirely successful. Some
jurisdictions require compliance with every detail or the.
benefits thereunder are lost. In Ferguson v. Ruppert 81 the
court held that inasmuch as the hospital had not been cited
to appear in the case, it refused to rule upon the validity of
the lien it claimed because all technicalities had not been
complied with. In the same state, New York, the hospital
81 1 N. Y. S. (2) 967.
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lien has been construed to be nothing more than a right of
action in contract for services rendered.82
It is a progressive sign when so many legislators endeavor
to protect the rights of the hospitals in conjunction with hos-
pital and insurance officials. Lien laws should be carefully
studied and the representative of the insurance companies at
the state capital in charge of legislation should be consulted.
A review of the several lien laws is advisable so as to deter-
mine the construction placed on several plans and to accept
the best suited to the circumstances and the laws of the state.
Hospitals are definitely in politics and it is essential that
careful study be continuous. There is a growing attitude that
hospitalization of the needy be made a local responsibility
and that all aid, financial and legal, be given to such publicly
controlled institutions.
In conclusion, need we stress the importance of studying
legislation? Approximately 62,000 bills are introduced in the
legislatures of the forty-eight states each year, and of these
more than 3,500 pertain to hospitals, doctors and nurses. We
have shown the activity with just a few of the major prob-
lems. Within the past few months legislation pertaining to
contracts for hospitalization, groups, insurance, payment
for care of indigent patients, compulsory health or accident
insurance, service plans,8" licensing laws, regulations for all
the different departments, social security and old age assist-
ance, unemployment compensation, workmen's compensa-
tion, socialized medicine, minimum wage laws, 4 taxation of
every nature and description, real and personal property,
sales tax, gift tax, privilege tax, etc., medical ethics, actions
for malpractice, pauper aid, childbirth duties, nurses, regis-
tration, license, education, internes, motor vehicle, sirens, am-
bulance operation and service, furnishing of oxygen tents,
82 Goldwater, Commissioner of Hospitals of New York v. Mendelson et al.,
8 N. Y. S. (2) 627.
83 Eighteen states have passed special enabling acts permitting non-profit hos-
pital service plans under regulation of their insurance departments.
84 Seven states have a minimum wage law.
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healing, crippled children, blind, dependent and indigent sick,
reports of all kinds, accident, death, wounds, diseases and
defects, fire inspection, building laws, water supply, food and
drugs, labor relations, collective bargaining, fair labor prac-
tices, child labor, mental health and disease, hospital facili-
ties available to all physicians, selection of doctor, hospital
incorporation, license and inspection, and dozens of others,
have been introduced in the various states. The time to in-
fluence legislation is before its enactment and this necessi-
tates close study and watchfulness on the part of hospital
officials. Legislators are anxious that the various institutions
express their opinion and show them how the legislative proj-
ects are either to their advantage or disadvantage. They are
usually interested in the welfare of the public and you will
find them cooperative when you work with them. The hos-
pital is always a community enterprise, whether public or
private, profit or charitable, and it needs the support and
faith of that community. Our hospitals are doing wonderful
work. They have developed from the same roots as churches
and schools. They are the fulfillment of a primary need of
man. They serve the rich and the poor and the average man;
they serve the entire community. We cannot do without them
and still consider ourselves a democracy. We must not only
preserve these splendid institutions but we must help to
strengthen and develop them.
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